Do we need propositions?

For a good while, I took the position, under the influence of Chisholm I think, that propositions and states of affairs were the same things under different nominalizations. I found that wasn't popular, so I started saying that they were "isomorphic" in a fairly standard sense: truth maps onto obtaining, entailment maps onto inclusion, etc.

I wasn't fully comfortable with this. I believe in a world of states of affairs. I take states of affairs to be things of the form *a's being F*. I believe in truthmakers (though it is tricky to state the view just right, I'm recently attracted to and identity theory). My discomfort with the isomorphism stance was that given the two previous confessions there was a crucial asymmetry: the proposition that a is F is true *because* the state of affairs of a's being F obtains.

For some reason it took me awhile to realize that what I really wanted to say was that propositions were true because their corresponding *events* occurred. This is because I think that propositions must be indexed to specific times to be truth-bearers but states of affairs needn't be indexed to times (I'd like to stipulate that than must not be). When you add a temporal relatum "slot" to a state of affairs you get an event. Event types are nothing other than states of affairs.

I was so taken with the expressive power of a property ontology (not a profligate theory, but a realist theory) and its utility for being an actualist that I admitted them into my ontology. I had it in the back of my mind to replace them. I already had God in my ontology so properties could be concepts in the mind of God. Human concepts are a subset of those concepts. Perhaps we have some concepts that God does not have, since some of our concepts are incomplete or incoherent. At any rate, I think I'm ready to complete the move to a thoroughgoing Divine Conceptualism Theory.

I hadn't thought about it for quite awhile until Bill Craig gave a talk on it at Notre Dame last month. Plantinga noted that a thing's falling under a concept is much like a property exemplification. This is how I always used to talk when I was a hard-core Aristotelian. I assume someone has written fairly extensively on this, but I don't know who. I picked it up from snippets of Aristotle, Porphyry, Augustine, Abelard, and Leibniz. I haven't read this stuff for probably seven or eight years so it's all a blur. I'm looking forward to returning to it.

I started to build propositions out of concepts, but I'm not sure I even *need* propositions. The primary truth-bearers are thoughts, judgements to be particular. A judgement is a mental affirmation that an entity falls under a concept (the first might itself be a concept as in the judgement that the concept *concept* falls under the concept *non-physical entity*). One person makes the same judgement as another when they both affirm that the same entity falls under the same concept.

So I believe in a world of concept fallings-under. Let's just call them concept exemplifications. Events will then be concept exemplifications at times. Whether I need propositions or not depends, I think, on how judgements are cashed out. I'm inclined to think that judgements are made in a language so that I'll get a T schema.

What I need are some challenging questions to help me define this view.