On Having Evidence Against Skepticism

On p. 210 of Epistemic Luck, Duncan writes:

"Everyone agrees that we lack internalist justification for believing in the denials of sceptical hypotheses..."

When I read that I thought my eyes must be deceiving me. There are still some Chisholmites around who definitely think otherwise, and their not *all* at Rochester! :-)~ Rich and Earl certainly think otherwise--they've recently discussed such matters in the "bookend" essays in the _Evidentialism_ book: the first and last chapters, which constitutes the newest material in the book. Also, as they mention there, Jim Pryor espouses the same view in his "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist".

The broadly Chisholmian idea is that there are true epistemic principles which connect certain kinds of experiences to certain kinds of beliefs. When we have those experiences we have evidence for certain beliefs they cause whether we think about it or not. So, for example, if it is true that

(EP1) If it seems to S that P then S has a reason for P

then if it seems to S that S has hands then S has a reason for S has hands. By applying the appropriate closure rule, we derive that S has a reason for It is not the case that I'm a handless brain in a vat.

The nature and identity of such principles (if there are more than one) is a big topic, but that's another story.

I feel like I must be reading him wrongly there, but I don't see where I could be going wrong.