A bit more on qualitative epistemic status concepts

I've been reading a lot lately on the idea of "acceptance" in theories of nonmonotonic logic. To accept something is often taken as being to accept it as "practically certain". There's always some statement about how the quest for certainty is a fool's errand and so on, but then it's often replaced by this vague close cousin. I haven't yet seen why practical certainty is A. much more likely to be acquired, B. very valuable in it's own right. It seems to me that whether practical certainty is something to be sought is a matter that will depend on a number of factors. Given an agent with a broad distribution of degrees of utilities--which I assume is most of us--a broad range of degrees of certainty will be important. For an agent--somewhat like me--with typically well-defined and extreme utilities fairly low probabilities are frequently sufficient for decisive action. So I'm not too bothered by the fact that I don't seem to be practically certain of much of anything.