In Search of a Unified Epistemology

Guy Axtell over at JanusBlog has posted on my draft "Realizing Virtue: A Unified Virtue Epistemology" (available here) and I won't be able to participate in the discussion till after classes today. But he begins by talking about other unificatory strategies extent in the literature and he quotes Goldman who evinces a unification which “make[s] a case for the unity of epistemic virtues in which the cardinal value, or underlying motif, is something like true, accurate, belief…The principle relation that epistemic virtues bear to the core epistemic value will be a teleological or consequentialist one. A process, trait, or action is an epistemic virtue to the extent that it tends to produce, generate, or promote (roughly) true belief.” (2002, 52)

But this seems utterly hopeless to me. Its *precisely* the fact that mere accuracy doesn't capture the kind of praiseworthy belief involved in high falootin (sp?) cognitive endeavors like scientific and philosophical theorizing that makes internalists so dissatisfied with reliabilism. Yet some internalists--I think Bonjour is sometimes guilty of this or at least seems to be on the brink of it--sometimes over-intellectualize justified belief in a way that robs the folk of much of their epistemic merit. In the paper I try to make room at the table for everyone. I really look forward to benefiting from Guy's comments. But for now, its off to class.