Higher-order attitudes and the "trickle-down effect"

If suspending judgment is the attitude that fits S's evidence relevant to whether S's belief that p is justified, it's plausible that it is also the attitude that fits S's evidence for the target proposition p.

HOWEVER, if there is a fourth propositional attitude of "passive suspension of judgment" (which I like to call the "nonplussed" attitude) then this might divide cases nicely as follows.

If I rightly judge that the evidence concerning "p is justified for me" is counterbalanced, then it seems that I ought to judge similarly concerning whether p is true.

BUT if I am simply befuddled by the question of whether p is justified for me much as I would be if I were asked to what degree my holding a brick epistemically supports the hypothesis that it will rain tomorrow, then this "passive" suspension of judgment needn't trickle down to the object-level like "active" suspension of judgment (plausibly) should.

td