Primary and Secondary Norms
I was reading Paul Weirich's _Realistic Decision Theory_ recently which is an attempt to progressively remove idealizations from standard decision theory to make it more applicable to non-ideal agents. He says in several places--beginning with the first page of the Preface--that this project is already implicit in the focus on maximizing *expected* utility as opposed to *fully informed* utility--what is most utile given what information I have, rather than what is most utile give all relevant information possible. Later in the book he makes the following distinction to highlighting the above difference.
I distinguish success goals and cognitive goals for decisions. The goal to maximize fully informed utility, the "factually objective" counterpart of subjective utility, is a success goal. The goal to maximize utility is cognitive. cognitive goals are subordinate to success goals. They express secondary goals aimed at promoting primary, success goals when obstacles arise. (148).
Williamson also uses the notion of primary and secondary norms to defend the knowledge account of assertion (see, e.g., Williamson 200, 257). Additionally it is often said that the subjective norm "Believe what the evidence indicates!" is subordinate to the objective norm "Believe what is true!" I have my doubts about this whole way of thinking.
If I had to chose between
A. being a member of a demon world where, though I get it wrong all the time, I have excellent responsibilist epistemic virtues or have J-ADROIT doxastic practices or whatever, and
B. being a member of a world where I'm just a pervasively lucky guesser and get it right all the time in spite of my doxastic practices.
I would clearly prefer A. Likewise, when it comes to praise and blame, I see someone exemplifying A as 100% praiseworthy (0% blameworthy) and someone exemplifying B as 0% praiseworthy. The same goes for the corresponding cases in assertion or decision theory.
This is not to deny the value of truth or some norm to seek it. Rather, it suggests to me that the so-called "secondary norms" are really the primary dimension of evaluation and that their value is not solely derived from their service to so-called "primary" goals. (Indeed there are skeptical worries they even do.) That is, the "subjective" goals have independent force in their own right and their satisfaction has independent value.

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