Knowledge, cum Williamson

I hate to say it, but I think I'm now (at least nearly) convinced that Williamson's characterization of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is correct. It now seems almost obvious to me that knowledge doesn't entail belief. I even kind of like the view of belief as "botched knowledge," it seems to harken back to the Classical view where knowledge and belief were exclusive of one another. I don't think the last bit is essential to the view though.

Some work I did on basic knowledge over the summer helped push me in this direction, but the following kind of case is persuasive to me. John was walking down the sidewalk talking excitedly with Bill. John knew he was walking down the street. John did not believe he was walking down the street.

He knew it because he was aware of it and awareness is factive.

I don't think this makes the justified true belief approach irrelevant at all, though. I've always been more interested in doxastic justification than the theory of knowledge. So when people do believe things and aren't merely aware of them--like I was merely aware of the laundry basket in my periphery a moment ago, now I believe it's there--I want a good theory of what reasons they have for that belief.

So my concession to Williamson and Co. here isn't *that* big of a deal (oh, and I'm also wavering on whether objective or subjective norms are primary), because I still don't think knowledge has much (any?) added value over justified, true belief since I utterly reject the knowledge norms (and always will!). :-)~