Damned with Faint Praise: More on Epistemic Norms

This is in part a continuation of my discussion with Clayton here.
Compare the two norms.

(T) Believe the truth.

and

(E) Form your beliefs on the basis of evidence.

I'm interested in the Ethics of Belief, so I'm interested in praise and blame for epistemic states (I was going to say "acts" which is closer to my own view, but I want to remain neutral for just a sec). So here's the deal. You don't get credit in any sense interesting from the perspective of an epistemic ethicist for satisfying (T) unless you do so by satisfying (E).

If you satisfy (T) but not (E)--or some similar norm--you were just lucky and so don't get any credit for it. The only positive evaluation we can give is "She's lucky" which is not a very interesting epistemic evaluation. Even if someone satisfies (T) a lot without satisfying (E), we'd just say "She's *really* lucky." Not very interesting for the epistemic ethicist.

Now maybe, unlike me, you you're interested in Reliablist Virtue more than Responsiblist Virtue. Well, to each their own, but I don't see that animal knowledge has much of an ethics. I don't think talk of norms makes much sense for animal knowledge. We can praise someone's perception as accurate in the same way we praise a thoroughbred horse for being fast, but that's praise only by a faint analogy. I'm interested in the real thing.