Here's something that is clearly possible:
To try to decide wheter p is true without regard for any practical concerns.
What comes to the same thing:
To try to believe p iff p.
Now suppose I correctly assess the evidence and correctly come to believe p.
My belief has some positive normative property as a result.
You got a better name for that than "epistemic justification"?
In the end, though, I just don't care what you call it. Call "*purely* epistemic justification," call it "theoretical justification," "evidential justification.". Whatever. It's *that* property I want my beliefs to have. So it's *that* notion I want to explore.
I don't care if it's related to knowledge, and I don't care who has or who has not discusses it in the past. To put it bluntly: this is about me and what I want.
If some philosopher really thinks I SHOULD care about something else, then I suppose I'll listen, though the proper reply seems to be "mind your own buisness."
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